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Introduction
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is today undergoing a change in its
basic economic objectives.' The PRC started undertaking this change under
Chairman Mao and has accelerated the pace under the present leadership. It
now seems that the acceleration may have been too rapid, at least for the time
being. The PRC started entering into negotiations for large economic devel-
opments on the theory that by the year 2000 it could become a developed, as
distinguished from a developing, state. Thus, we have all read about con-
tracts with the Japanese for a large steel mill, contracts with American com-
panies for iron ore extraction and processing, and contracts with American
companies for large tourist hotels. These and many others were all reported
in the press by the foreign entity. Subsequently, reports of "cancelled con-
tracts" filled the press.' It is interesting to note that many of these publicized
contracts were not finalized. Some were only initialed; others provided that
they were subject to review; and still others were only letters of intent and not
final binding contracts. There are only two cases of cancellation involving
"binding contracts." Both involve the petrochemical industry and Japan,
which claims that there were binding contracts. That issue is being resolved.
But in the other cases, it is clear that the contracts were not binding.
What caused this slowdown? First of all, it appears that the PRC added up
the scorecard on the cost and decided that its financial obligations were too
great and that it had to reorganize its objectives. And that reorganization has
been mistakenly looked upon by some China-watchers as a serious and radi-
cal change in policy. The PRC has merely realized that the pace had to be
*Mr. Surrey practices law in Washington, D.C. The author thanks Professor Paul D. Reynolds
for assistance in preparing the footnotes.
'For background to the changes in objectives, see Wall St. J., March 26, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
'See, e.g., Kramer, Pause in Peking, Wall St. J., March 6, 1979, at 1, col. 2; Kramer, China
Begins Campaign to Explain Why It Must Cut Plans to Boost Heavy Industry, Wall St. J.,
March 26, 1979, at 6, Col. 2; See also Wall St. J. Apr. 9, 1979, at 13, col. 1.
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slowed and its objectives and timetable restructured. This is important be-
cause American business must assess realistically what kind of business op-
portunities are available. However, before identifying the more likely areas
of business opportunities for clients, it is appropriate to review the legal
mechanisms and procedures available to them.
1. Legal Mechanisms and Investment
Procedures in the PRC
A. The Joint Venture Law
Recent developments, both before and since recognition, 3 have also led the
PRC to try to formalize its legal institutions insofar as international trade is
concerned.' It has, for example, passed framework legislation for joint ven-
tures and is negotiating some further proposals. It has not yet, however,
signed a joint venture agreement. Recently, the People's Congress considered
seven new laws. One of these was the Joint Venture Law' which Professor
Reynolds treats elsewhere in this issue. It was adopted by the Fifth National
People's Congress in July 1979. See Reynolds article infra. The law provides
that there can be foreign and Chinese jointly owned corporations organized
in China, with a minimum percentage of foreign ownership required, and no
statutory maximum,6 The legislation enacted will be followed shortly by reg-
ulations to be issued by an independent commission yet to be established. The
commission will review joint venture agreements.'
'The Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 274 (1979).
'On China's former and current trade law and practice see Lubman, Trade Between the United
States and the People's Republic of China: Practice, Policy, and Law, 8 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lubman]. Starr & Kaplan, The Legal Framework of China
Trade, in DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA: AMERICAN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES IN THE 1970s 7379 (W.
Whitson ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Starr & Kaplan]; Edwards, The Legal Framework of
Chinese Trade, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA 63 (H. Holtzman ed. 1976);
Cohen, Chinese Law and Sino-American Trade, in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY
178 (A. Eckstein ed. 1971).
'Wall St. J., June 27, 1979, at 5, col. I.
'After this talk was given, there were indications, not necessarily correct, that overseas inves-
tors would be limited to a 49% maximum holding in most cases. Id. The text of the Act requires,
"in general," 25% minimum foreign participation. No maximum is stipulated. Art. 4, Law of
the People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment,
adopted Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress, July I, 1979 (attached as
Appendix) [hereinafter cited as Joint Venture Law]. There is an unverified report that China will
always have at least 25% of the investment, Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1979, at 6, col. I.
'Joint Venture Law, note 6 supra, Art. 3 states that a proposed "joint venture shall apply to
the Foreign Investment Commission ... for authorization of the agreements and contracts...
articles of association ... and the Commission shall authorize or reject these documents within
three months." No indication of the standards or criteria for authorization is given. Article 12
also provides for extension of authorization by the Commission. No indication is given whether
the statute of the Commission composition, powers or establishment. On the same day the
statute was published, Xinhua (Hsinhua), the Chinese news agency, said that the Foreign Invest-
ment Control Commission as well as the China International Trust Investment Co. were being
set up "to coordinate the use of foreign investment and technology." Wall St. J., July 9, 1979, at
People's Republic of China: Trade and Economic Relations 17
The PRC itself is not yet certain of the precise form that joint ventures
should take. There is a possibility that the pay-out to the foreign investor on
his investment may be authorized before there is a pay-out of dividends to
both parties. One can expect that the joint venture agreements will be struc-
tured on the basis that the Chinese entity will install the needed infrastructure
such as buildings, land, labor and some or all of the raw materials. The
foreign partner will invest technology,' machinery, and possibly raw mate-
rials. Both will contribute capital to the extent required. There will be some
provision for the percentage of foreign exchange and domestic earnings that
can be repatriated to the foreign owner;9 they probably will be liberal on this
in the beginning. The earnings, however, will be subject to taxation in the
PRC. I0 As of this writing, a corporate income tax decree is expected shortly
to be followed by a decree sometime in 1980 covering taxes on individual
incomes.
Another arrangement that can be made is a compensation agreement
whereby the foreign entity provides raw materials, machinery and tech-
nology, and buys back all or a percentage of the production for foreign
marketing with a credit for the value of its contribution. The PRC is feeling
its way in this development.
In addition to the joint venture agreement, consideration is being given to
the establishment of free zones, the same as United States free zones, where
imported raw materials can be brought in duty-free and goods manufactured
and exported without there being any tax on the operation. The PRC is con-
sidering whether to permit one hundred percent ownership in the free zone, if
and when such free zones are established.
There are certain legal problems in making such investments which are
being eliminated so that these forms of investment can become a reality.
First, there had to be diplomatic recognition, and the problem of American
claims against the PRC for American assets lost in China at the time of
nationalization had to be addressed. Under President Truman's executive
order, the United States froze PRC assets in this country. The PRC re-
sponded and took over United States assets in China." Hearings have been
6, col. 2. Subsequently the Commission was established with Vice Premier Gu Mu (Ku Mu) as
its head. Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
'The Joint Venture Law, note 6 supra, stipulates that the technology contributed by the
foreign partner "shall be truly advanced and appropriate to China's needs." Art. 5. Breach of
the above requirement may entail damages. Article 5 states, "In cases of losses caused by decep-
tion through the intentional provision of outdated equipment or technology, compensation shall
be paid for the losses." There may well be a practical conflict in that what China needs most may
not be the most recent technology. Therefore it should not be considered "truly advanced."
'Joint Venture Law, note 6 supra, arts. 10, 11.
'Id. Article 7 mentions "a joint venture income tax."
I'Events leading to President Truman's actions and their implementation into United States
law are described in great detail in Bayar, The Blocked Chinese Assets: Present Status and Future
Disposition, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (1975). The Chinese decree, Government Administrative
Council Issues Order for the Control of American Government and Private Property in China
(Dec. 28, 1950), is found in J. COHEN & H. CHIU, PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 686
(1974).
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held to determine the value of the claims for United States property taken by
the PRC. The question that remained was how to achieve a satisfactory pay-
out. Just recently, the PRC initialed an agreement with former Secretary of
Treasury Blumenthal and then signed it with former Secretary of Commerce
Kreps which solved this problem. t2 This means that PRC-owned assets will be
able to come into this country without fear of attachment by United States
creditors with claims against the PRC.
The important factor to be borne in mind in any negotiations with the PRC
regarding the forms and details of an agreement is that, while the country's
representatives may appear totally inflexible, this appearance of inflexibility
arises out of an uncertainty, on both sides, as to how a transaction should be
accomplished. Therefore, if one has the patience to deal with the apparent
inflexibility and explain the reasons for a transaction in a particular way, the
Chinese negotiators will have the patience to listen to you and consider and
review your proposal objectively with their superiors.13
B. Protection of Industrial Property Rights
A major question lawyers are likely to face is how to negotiate an agree-
ment protecting industrial property rights, patents, trademarks, copyrights,
and know-how. The only such property right protected today under Chinese
law is the trademark, and that comes about because PRC law provides that
trademarks cannot be registered unless the two countries involved have en-
tered into a bilateral arrangement. In 1973, when the National Council for
United States-China Trade (NCUSCT) Board was in the PRC, and again in
1975, a bilateral agreement between the National Council and the PRC was
discussed but not accepted. Thereafter, however, the registration of some
Chinese trademarks in the United States was interpreted as having the effect
of a bilateral agreement. With this background, the PRC agreed in 1978 to
register United States trademarks.
1. PATENTS, KNOW-How AND COPYRIGHT
The PRC does not grant patent, know-how, or copyright protection.
Therefore, these protections have to be spelled out in any contract. In effect,
one must take the patent protection, know-how protection, or copyright pro-
tection language of international conventions on these issues and write that
language into the particular contract.
'Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the
People's Republic of China Concerning Settlement of Claims, INT'L TRADE REP., U.S. EXPORT
WEEKLY, No. 257, May 15, 1979, at N-I. See also Agreement on Trade Relations Between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China, 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1041
(1979).
"For an examination of Chinese negotiating techniques and tactics, see Alfred le Jenkins,
Dealing With The Chinese: Some Observations of a Diplomat, in Doing Business With China (P.
Reynold, D. Buxbaum, & C. Joseph ed. 1980) (to be published in April 1980 by Praeger-Holt,
Rinehart and Winston).
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Under the Trade Agreement Act which was signed on July 7, 1979," pro-
tection is given to these industrial property rights. Vice-President Mondale's
prediction is that it would be presented to Congress in late 1979 for review
and a vote within sixty days thereafter.'
C. Dispute Settlement
Another problem that arises is that of the procedures for settlement of
disputes. The Trade Agreement provides for a procedure for settlement of
disputes. Dispute settlement is an important issue, not only in the PRC but
wherever one does business. It is usually the last item of a contract to be
negotiated, often after the client has departed the country, leaving the attor-
neys to work it out, typically with instruction not to kill the deal by disagree-
ing on arbitration. However, when a dispute does arise the client can never
understand how his lawyer could ever agree to a provision for arbitration in a
foreign country and he complains bitterly.
In the past, the Chinese have favored negotiations as a means of settle-
ment.' 6 Failing negotiation, nonbinding conciliation is favored. The word
nonbinding is not used, but traditionally nonbinding conciliation took place
as a part of the negotiations. The third and least favored means of dispute
resolution in the PRC is arbitration.
Arbitration in China is a continuation of the process of conciliation. If one
persists, the Chinese negotiators will agree to arbitration in a third country.
Working with the American Arbitration Association, and based upon
American arbitration experience with the Soviet Union, the Chinese were
urged to accept Sweden as the desired third country under the rules of the
Swedish Chamber of Commerce. The Trade Agreement provides for the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law arbitration rules
(UNCITRAL Rules) or other rules agreed to between the parties."
Several years ago, at the urging of the American Arbitration Association
and the NCUSCT, it was agreed to try the Joint Conciliation procedure using
one PRC and one American conciliator.
In the first case that was submitted to joint conciliation, the PRC State
Trading Corporation, which was involved and perhaps concerned by the
concept of an American sitting in on the conciliation of the dispute, nego-
tiated an acceptable resolution with the United States company. The case
clearly demonstrates both the merits and success of such a process, for the
very prospect of joint conciliation leads the parties to negotiate a settlement.
The second case that was submitted actually went to conciliation, and it
"The Agreement was submitted October 23, 1979. 125 CONG. REC. S14953 (1979). See note 15
infra.
'Wall St. J., Oct. 24, 1979, at 3, col. 2.
'See Holtzman, Resolving Disputes in U.S.-China Trade in Legal Aspects of U.S.-China
Trade (H. Holtzmann ed 1975); Lubman, supra note 4, at 48-49.
"The UNCITRAL Rules, reproduced in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 701 (1976), were approved for
use in the U.S-China Trade Agreement, supra note 14, art. VIII(2).
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illustrates some of the basic differences between our own legal system and
that of the PRC. The United States company filed a typical American legal
brief of forty pages, containing many annexes, charts, dates, and correspon-
dence. The Chinese filed about a two and one-half page telex referring to the
spirit of the Shanghai Communique and the need to settle the dispute ami-
cably, with a view to the parties entering into future business. At the hearings,
the American conciliator asked the parties questions intended to clarify de-
tails which were unclear from the documents and statements; his PRC coun-
terpart, on the other hand, asked mostly theoretical and penetrating philo-
sophical questions. After much give-and-take it became apparent that the
dispute would not be settled on the basis of any one legal concept. A settle-
ment was negotiated only through a process of concrete offers and counter-
offers. Each party restated its original position, and each found the solution
compatible with its legal theories.
Experience with this procedure argues very strongly that a contract nego-
tiated in the PRC today should provide for joint conciliation, with provision
that either party may terminate the joint conciliation at any time it finds that
the process is not producing satisfactory results. Such a termination would
then put the dispute into arbitration. Experience would also suggest that the
joint conciliation should be held in Peking. This concession would provide a
better basis for both parties agreeing to the arbitration being held in a third
country. Today should arbitration be necessary, perhaps the wisest counsel
would be to apply the UNCITRAL Rules with a third country situs. If that is
not acceptable, then the rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
should be considered, with the proceedings being held in Stockholm. 8
D. Force Majeure
Regarding the standard force majeure clause in a contract, acts of God are
not recognized in the PRC because God is not recognized. Acts of nature,
however, achieve the same end. The PRC concept of force majeure does not
encompass labor strikes. ' 9 It will probably recognize as force majeure a strike
by a third party, that is, if one has a supplier and the supplier has a strike. But
if the strike is in the contracting party's own plant, its argument will be that it
is really one's own fault that a strike has occurred, and therefore it is not
covered by the force majeure clause.20
What about United States Government actions which prevent implementa-
tion of the contract? Contracts involving exports of either hardware or tech-
nology from the United States should provide that the agreement does not
come into effect until all the necessary licenses and approvals of the respec-
tive governments have been obtained. The reason for this is that the PRC
does not consider the failure to get an export license for the technology or
"ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN (Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 1977).
"See Starr & Kaplan, supra note 4, at 385.
"Strikes being a natural outcome of "capitalist oppression of the working class."
People's Republic of China: Trade and Economic Relations 21
commodity involved to be the result of force majeure. Since the PRC govern-
ment will comply with the contract terms, and our government is presumed to
do likewise, the risk is on our contractor.
There is always a risk, of course, that after issuance of an export license,
some intervening event will occur, which is not unheard of in the export
control administration, such as a change in our governmental policy, which
will result in the license being withdrawn before the transfer of the technology
is complete. That is a risk but generally a minimal one.
Let us look now at the questions of the role of the lawyer in doing business
in PRC. The Chinese may say during the negotiations, or tell the client, that a
lawyer is not required in the negotiations. While a lawyer may not be neces-
sary on the first trip (an agent or consulting organization may be able to open
doors and provide feasibility studies), a lawyer's presence is helpful in the
negotiations. Apart from legal drafting, the lawyer sometimes can take the
burden of argument away from the client and leave the client relationships on
a much better basis.
The Chinese really do not resent the lawyer's presence if it is a constructive
one. They will talk and joke about lawyers, but one of the laws that they
enacted at the recent People's Congress is referred to as the "lawyer's law," a
law to govern the relations among their own civilians in dealing with each
other. So they really are recognizing, as they sometimes admit, the need for
more lawyers.
E. Official Financing Sources to Aid Trade
A brief word on the probabilities of American lawyers being able to seek
Export-Import Bank" or World Bank financing is appropriate. Turning first
to the Export-Import Bank, the trade agreement must come into effect and
there must also be a finding of compliance with, or a waiver of compliance by
the President of, the Jackson-Vanik amendment on a free emigration2 be-
fore the PRC will be eligible for bank financing. It is difficult to explain to the
Chinese that while the Jackson-Vanik amendment really deals with the Sov-
iets and their emigration policy as applied to Jews, it applies to the PRC by its
terms, for the PRC, as a communist country, is covered by the language of
the amendment. Today, Chinese emigration policy will meet the test and
most favored nation treatment of the PRC could take place.
But that will not by itself make Export-Import Bank financing available.
There is another problem, and that is really a historical problem. When
Chiang Kai-shek left the mainland and went to Taiwan, he took everything
that was movable, and this included equipment which had been financed in
whole or in part by the Export-Import Bank. There was, however, some
equipment financed by the Export-Import Bank that became a part of vari-
I'On Eximbank and its activities, see Rendell, Export Financing and the Role of the Export-
Import Bank of the United States, I I J. INT'L LAWS & EcoN. 91 (1976).
:'Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (Supp. 1977).
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ous installations such as dams or harbor installations which he could not take
with him. As a successor government, the People's Republic of China is
considered by our government to be obligated to pay that debt, plus interest.
The debt is $23 million in principal, and the interest to date is probably $29
million.23 The PRC position is that the debt was not incurred by the present
government, and its position is pragmatic: it does not know where some of
the material is, much less know if it is working, or it does not want it, and it
cannot be put in the unfortunate position of paying for the equipment. Some-
how that problem must be solved. Pragmatically, a solution will be found,
because it is in the interest of both countries that Export-Import Bank financ-
ing be available.24
The problem in relation to availability of international institutional financ-
ing is whether the PRC is going to join the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank. At the Nairobi meetings of the World Bank and the Mone-
tary Fund several years ago, the PRC asked that the Republic of China be
expelled, but did not itself apply for membership. The Monetary Fund and
the World Bank took no action. The PRC may now be actively considering
applying for membership in the Monetary Fund, which is a prerequisite to
membership in the World Bank.25 However, membership in the fund requires
that the applicant reveal considerable information about its financial condi-
tion and assume certain obligations. The PRC is obviously hesitant to do this.
On the other hand, it will want the World Bank loans and specifically loans
from the International Development Association as the debt is payable in
local currency, interest rates are low, and the terms can be up to forty years.
These are unique terms, and the Chinese could use such loans. They may also
want regular World Bank loans, as well as International Finance Corpora-
tion participation in the financing package, so in due course, it may apply for
membership.
If that is the case, American investors will then have Export-Import Bank
financing, International Monetary Fund support, World Bank loans, and
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) guaranties if OPIC is still
in existence and the PRC agrees to enter into the innocuous agreement with
our government that is required to insure private American investment over-
seas. The availability of the facilities of these governmental and international
institutions will obviously make possible increased private United States
bank financing.
"The Bank's records show the obligation under the heading "China (Mainland)." EXPORT-
IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, CUMULATIVE RECORD BY COUNTRY, Feb. 12, 1934, June
30, 1971, at 10. The Bank's policy that this is payable by the PRC despite Peking's denial was
stated by Harold F. Linder, President of the Board of the Export-Import Bank, in East-West
Trade, Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 192, 199 (1964) (statement of Harold F. Linder).
"On the possible scope and limits of such financing, see Teske, Kravalis & Lenz, U.S. Trade
with China Prospects Through 1985, Bus. AMERICA, Feb. 12, 1979, at 7.
"Wall St. J., Feb. 27, 1979, at 8; Denny, International Finance in the People's Republic of
China, in JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, CHINA: A REASSESS-
MENT OF THE ECONOMY, 44th CONG., IST SESS., 653 at 674 (1975).
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II. Trade and Investment Potential
Let us now turn to where the business potential exists. Prior to the reorgan-
ization of its economic priorities, the PRC had put the primary emphasis in
recent years on heavy industry. This included steel plants and other heavy
industrial investments. Secondary emphasis was placed on light industry,
agriculture, and maintenance of the military. Today these priorities have
changed. Insofar as the industrial sector is concerned, the PRC's first objec-
tives will be improvements in agriculture and light industry." Light industry
includes, most significantly, consumer goods. Agriculture is obviously a
priority because the country must import agricultural commodities in order
to feed almost a billion people in a nation which has very little arable land.
The goal is to decrease their dependence on outside food suppliers. This
means mechanization, the introduction of new technology, and the use of
equipment as a substitute for labor intensive practices. This will cause prob-
lems, because up to now the PRC has had total employment. When mechani-
zation is introduced, the policy of maintaining full employment becomes
more difficult to sustain.
Insofar as light industry is concerned, there are two reasons for giving it
priority. One is to satisfy the demands of the people in the PRC for some of
the amenities of life. The Chinese have savings institutions, and many have
savings accounts. While salaries are not large in our terms, bear in mind that
housing, clothing, food and medical services are provided at a minimal cost.
They can spend their money for a bicycle, which is the major means of trans-
portation, a sewing machine, a radio, a camera, or a television set. There is
demand among the Chinese people for more creature comforts. As with any
people, these demands must be met to some extent.
The second reason for concentration on light industry is that light industry
provides an important component of the PRC's export potential. Among the
goods currently exported are petroleum, which they are developing, coal,
minerals, ores, light industry products such as rugs, handicraft goods, and
textiles, and certain agricultural products. Textiles are a problem, for they
are not only being exported to the United States, but to other countries as well
which generally have quotas. Large textile producing countries will demand
increased quotas. Therefore light industry and agriculture will have a higher
priority than heavy industry and military support requirements.
In looking at business opportunities, one must also look to the priorities
given to developing national resources and developing an economic infra-
structure which can support and make possible industrial and agricultural
development. These areas of economic activity include the development of
petroleum and coal resources, both for internal use and for export, and the
development of transportation and communication infrastructure.
"6See Karmer, China Begins Campaigning to Explain Why It Must Cut Plans to Boost Heavy
Industry, Wall St. J., Mar. 26, 1979, at 6, col. 1, citing article in People's Daily.
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Oil is being exported today, including minor amounts to the United States;
it is low in sulphur content but high in wax content, which creates the need for
some refining adjustment.27 United States and other foreign companies are
negotiating offshore exploration contracts which will involve American com-
panies in marketing some of the crude oil extracted.
With respect to transportation, the main method of transportation of
goods in China today is by river, while for people it is by air. Thus, the PRC
needs to build roads, and its railroad system may require expansion. It is clear
that the development of transportation is urgent.
In a fourth area, the PRC is concentrating on improving its communica-
tions systems. It needs to develop its internal communications, including
radio and telephone systems. Both in terms of the economic operation of the
society and in terms of maintaining a flow of information to the people, the
communications systems must be expanded and improved.
These, therefore, are the areas where technology and equipment from this
country and other Western sources are going to be stressed.
What will be the dimension of business for clients? It is going to develop
slowly.2" There is a dreamlike, wishful thinking among many businessmen
who see the business opportunities booming overnight, but the PRC is going
to be a slowly developing market. It will be a good market in the near future
for businesses involved in the manufacture of goods for export from the PRC
and also for high technology in the fields in which it is needed: petroleum and
coal production, transportation and communications. But modernization
cannot come all at once; the PRC cannot afford it all at once, and as someone
has said, you are not going to sell toothpaste or toothbrushes to one billion
people.
While it is an exciting market, it is not a market that will boom and boom;
rather it will grow in an orderly pattern. And bear in mind that for the China
market to grow so as to absorb our exports of technology and hardware, our
market must also grow to receive its raw materials and light industrial goods.
Trade with the People's Republic of China will only expand on a reciprocal,
although not necessarily equal, basis.
2
'The need to remove wax led to a major contract for a United States firm. See Stevens, Small
Firms to Benefit from China TradeA long With Big Ones, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1978, at 1, col. I.
2 For the most recent official estimate of United States-China Trade prospects see Teske,
Kravalis and Lenz, U.S. Trade With China Prospects Through 1985, Bus. America, Feb. 12,
1979, at 3.
